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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC-00380-87/1
28 January 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution

FROM: [redacted]

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Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe

SUBJECT: January Warning and Forecast Report

1. Attached is my report to the DCI based on our warning meeting held on 21 January 1987.

2. Next month's warning meeting will be held on Wednesday, 18 February 1987 at 1025 in room 7-E-62, CIA Headquarters. Please telephone attendance plans to our office [redacted] and have clearances certified by COB 16 February 1987.

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3. I also encourage you to phone in suggestions for the agenda and names of volunteers to make opening presentations. It would be helpful to have your comments for the next meeting by Thursday, 12 February 1987.

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Attachment



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Washington, D.C. 20505

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National Intelligence Council

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28 January 1987MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe


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SUBJECT: January Warning and Forecast Report

I. MAIN DISCUSSION ITEMSA. The Impact in Europe of a Zero-Zero INF Agreement

1. Discussion. Many analysts believe that a zero-zero INF accord, as it would drive wedges between NATO allies, would be more to Soviet advantage than ours. But the Soviets probably will not move on the issue so long as they see some prospect for broader arms negotiations and concessions on SDI.

A zero-zero solution would have several negative effects among our key NATO allies, all of whom privately have expressed strong opposition to a total withdrawal of INF from Europe.



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2. Warning Notice. Without some constraints on SRINF and conventional forces, a zero-zero INF accord would mean a return to something approaching the East-West strategic imbalance of the mid-1970s. The prospect of another divisive security debate (and a backtracking from the difficult but successful INF decision) might incline some NATO leaders to redress a new imbalance through some sort of tacit accommodation with Moscow rather than supporting strategic countermeasures.

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B. French Involvement in Chad: Prospects for Escalation

1. Discussion and Warning Notice. French involvement in Chad continues to grow despite France's reluctance to engage Libyan forces directly and Prime Minister Chirac's fears of complicating negotiations on French hostages in Lebanon. The government's readiness to back Habre's forces in Chad with new arms deliveries creates three possible scenarios which could pose problems for the US:

- If a prospective Libyan counterattack threatens Habre with strategic defeat north of the 16th parallel, France would probably have to escalate by committing at least French air forces. If the French failed to respond, we would face a strengthened Libyan position in North Africa.

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- If the fighting begins to take a political toll at home, the French might seek a private deal with Libya. Since Mitterrand was burned on such a deal in 1984, this time he is more likely to adopt a tough posture, allowing Chirac to make the deal and take the opprobrium.

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II. MONITORING ITEMS

A. Malta's Libyan Connection

1. Discussion. Libya's involvement in Malta, while so far falling short of our worst fears, may increase in the run-up to the Maltese elections due in May. The Libyans provided financial support to Mintoff's Labor Party in the last elections and can be expected to do so again; and with several instances of violence already reported, the Libyans may consider covert actions in Malta. Former Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's influence may also be on the rise, particularly if he gains the Presidency next month.

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B. Spain: Base Negotiations

1. Discussion. Gonzalez seems to be calling the shots, despite signs of restiveness among military leaders over their diminishing prerogatives. The appointment of a civilian head of the Guardia Civil, as well as the ongoing reorganization and "civilianization" of the MOD, may signal growing political-military strains over US base negotiations, Spain's role in NATO, and other security issues. While Gonzalez remains fully in command, he may be obliged to adjust his negotiating position to appease the military.

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III. UNSCHEDULED WARNING ITEMS

A. Romania: Growing Unrest. An anonymous pamphlet calling for a general strike in Bucharest last Friday -- although it failed to induce many to challenge the ruthless security forces -- is symptomatic of growing unrest in the country. Severe winter food and energy shortages already have led to scattered protests and even a reported hijacking of a truck carrying foodstuffs. Continued and probably heightened unrest is likely until spring brings some relief to the Romanian population.

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B. Turkey: The Islamic Fundamentalist Challenge. Growing tension in schools and the streets over government sanctions against Islamic fundamentalism have followed President Evren's threat to "crush" any fundamentalist challenge. Prime Minister Ozal, caught between Evren's hard line and pressure from the right wing of his own party, has temporized so far. Along with a growing insurgency along Turkey's southern borders and mounting concern in Ankara over an Iranian victory in the Gulf War, these developments may portend a new era of instability.

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SUBJECT: January Forecast and Warning Report

Outside Attendees

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Maj. Emery G. Maynard, Jr.
 James Scofield
 Benjamin L. Wong
 Andrew B. Cook
 Vivienne Z. Ascher
 Capt. Brian Escobedo
 Capt. John W. House
 Debra L. Cagan
 Eugene Price

NSA/G51
 NSA/A05
 NSA/G509
 NSA/G511
 NSA/G534
 DIA/DB-3B
 DIA/DB-5E3
 DIA/DIO
 DIA/JSI
 DIA/DB-3B1
 DIA/DE-3
 DIA/DB-5E3
 DIA/OA-2
 DIA/DE-3
 DIA/JSI
 Army/DAMI-FIC
 Army/ITAC(AIAIT-AN)
 Army/ITAC(AIAIT-AN)
 Navy/ONI
 State/INR/WEA/SE
 AF/INER
 AF/INER
 State/INR/SEE
 State/INR/WEA/SE

Inside Attendees

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